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How is one to value water? Indeed, how does anyone value anything?
There are three broad categories of answers to these questions. One relies on
the notion of an intrinsic value of a good. In other words, there is a definitive
value of a particular good, and this value can be determined by some means.
Theological speculations on the "just price" of a good and other speculations
on "innate values" of various things often fall into this category.1 A second
category of answers is to deny that a particular good is capable of valuation.'

* Galen J. Roush Professor of Business Law and Regulation & Co-Director, Center for Business
Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University and Senior Associate, Property & Environment
Research Center, Bozeman, Montana. A.B., 1981, Princeton; J.D., M. Pub. Aff. 1984, University of Texas
at Austin; Ph.D. (Economics), 1994, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. My thanks to Jonathan Adler
and Roger Meners for comments.
1.

See THOMAS E. WOODS JR., THE CHURCH AND THE MARKET:

A

CATHOLIC DEFENSE OF THE

FREE ECONOMY (2005) (examining theological critiques of the market and arguing they are mistaken).
2. See Frank J. Dietz & Herman R. J. Vollebergh, ExplainingInstrument Choice in Environmental
Policies, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 141 (Jeroen C.J.M. Van Den
Bergh ed., 1999) (describing an objection to pricing natural assets and human fives).
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Human lives, for example, are often classified as being incapable of valuation.'
A third category of answers depends on observing human behavior, in
particular on observing the actual choices real people make with their
resources. Markets fall into this third category, and it is my contention that it
is markets' connection with real choices, made by real people with real
consequences for the people making the choices, that enables markets to value
resources, including water, in a fashion that leads to better outcomes than the
alternatives. Indeed, I will argue that markets provide the only way to value
resources, including water, which enables their use without provoking
conflicts among those who compete for their use.4
The case for markets for water is strong and rests on four claims. First,
markets are a low cost means of providing important signals to others about
the value of various uses of water. These signals help water flow to the uses
where it produces the largest net benefit for water users. Second, markets
allow the uses of water to vary with changes in knowledge and demand.7
Because they provide a dynamic, rather than a static, valuation, markets are
adaptable to changed circumstances.' Third, markets encourage the production
of new knowledge about water-new ways to use water, new ways to conserve
water to make it available for other uses, new ways to think about water's uses,
and new ways to deliver water. 9 In short, markets encourage investment in
meeting human needs.1 ° Fourth, markets do not require large-scale agreement
among their participants on overall ends, allowing a diversity of individual
ends to co-exist peacefully. 1 In short, markets excel at generating positivesum transactions that benefit all parties, precisely the situation in which all
should aspire to be. 2 Part I of this Article examines each of these claims for
the appropriateness of market valuation of water.

3. Id.
4. A note on sources is necessary here. Because of the shortened format for the symposia
contributions, I draw heavily on a smaller number of sources than would be appropriate for a longer article.
In particular, for support for the case for water markets, I rely heavily on the following sources: FREDRIK
SEGERFELDT, WATER FOR SALE (2005) (surveying privatization on a global scale); ROGER BATE & RICHARD
TREN, THE COST OF FREE WATER (2002) (analyzing water issues in developing countries); VANDANA SmvA,

WATER WARS (2002) (the standard antimarket reference, who Segerfeldt refers to as "[o]ne of the megastars of the antiglobalization movement"); TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS

(1997) (the standard source for the case for water markets); Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, & Terry L.
Anderson, Principlesfor Water, 15 TuL. ENvTL. L.J. 335 (2002) (an earlier exploration of issues similar to
those discussed here); Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law for
Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REv. 861 (2001) (for historical
materials).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. See infra Part I.C.
11.

See infra Part I.D.

12.

See infra Part I.D.

THE CASE FOR MARKET VALUATION OF WATER

2006]

975

Markets are far from perfect, of course. But, critiques of markets in
general, and critiques of water markets in particular, often conflate
dissatisfactions with human nature or other features of society with problems
in the market. 3 Experts in various disciplines fret that the public does not
listen to the experts enough; people who dislike private property on principle
dislike the idea of relying on property rights in markets, and people who are
unhappy with markets' outcomes insist that markets get resource allocation
wrong because of markets' failure to adequately capture some cost or benefit
of various outcomes or to consider some value that market critics consider so
important that everyone should be required to pay attention to it. In Part II, I
examine representative versions of the criticisms of market processes as
applied to water markets and show that they are mistaken. Next, I consider the
conditions necessary for establishing markets. 4 Markets do not spring forth
from the brow of Adam Smith; they require secure property rights and the rule
of law to function.' 5 I briefly examine these necessary foundations for markets
and how they can be applied to water markets. 6 Part IR concludes by
discussing the role of water markets in the future.
I. THE CASE FOR

MARKETS

The case for markets is usually presented as an argument for economic
efficiency and little else.' 7 As Anderson and Snyder note, "[tlraditional
economic policy analysis has emphasized efficiency without considering the
institutions that foster it."' 8 Markets are indeed efficiency-promoting
institutions, as ably described in the vast literature in neoclassical economics.
The neoclassical case for efficient outcomes is less than a complete statement

13. It is difficult to know how to respond to a statement such as Shiva's claim that "[h]igher prices
under free-market conditions will not lead to conservation. Given the tremendous economic inequalities,
there is a great possibility that the economically powerful will waste water while the poor pay the price."
SHIVA, supra note 4, at 31. It is simply a fact of nature that, all else equal, higher prices reduce use of
normal goods even for the wealthy. Wealthy water users may not reduce their use of water as much as Shiva
or other critics would prefer, but at a high enough price even Bill Gates will reduce his water use because
he faces an opportunity cost from using his resources on water. That is, he will not be able to spend money
on something else if he spends it on water. See WOODS, supra note 1, at 30 ("It obviously makes no sense
to say that the law of diminishing marginal utility should be subordinated to moral law, or that the economic
law that a division-of-labor economy will produce more material wealth than one that lacks the
specialization of tasks should be subordinated to the moral law."). Thomas Crocker suggests that the failure
to adequately consider economic analysis in environmental policy generally "stem[s] from the nearly twocenturies-old shallow-brained propensity of intellectuals to avoid reading economics and to complain,
without reading, that its content and arguments correspond perfectly to commercial interests." Thomas D.
Crocker,A Short History of Environmental and Resource Economics, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 32, 40 (Jeroen C.J.M. Van Den Bergh ed., 1999).
14. See infra Part I.E.
15. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 14.
16. See infra Part Il.E.
17.
See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4,at 18.
18.

Id.

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:973

of the virtues of markets, however, largely because neoclassical economic
analyses tend to have relatively little to say about the actual operation of
markets. In most neoclassical economic analysis, markets are simply therethe story is not the market's operation but the end product of the market
process. Supply and demand curves cross, defining an equilibrium point by
their intersection. Neoclassical stories are usually either a sad tale of a market
imperfection that gets us away from the optimal intersection of the supply and
demand curves, or a more uplifting tale of how we get back to that optimal
intersection generally through the intervention of a kindly economic analyst
who calculates the appropriate subsidy or tax to precisely offset the distortion
introduced by the market imperfection. This approach long dominated
economic thinking about water.' 9
This is all to the good in many instances, for there is much that all can
learn by thorough analysis of market imperfections' contributions to the
outcomes we observe in the world. Some taxes, for example, are more
distortionary than others and cause greater dead-weight losses.2' Similarly, the
case for free trade based on comparative statics analysis is an extraordinarily
powerful one. 2' And we do not need any particularly sophisticated economics
to see that there is something fundamentally wrong when urban residents pay
thousands of times more for their water than do agricultural users, or when rice
is grown in the desert while cities build expensive desalinization plants.22 The
neoclassical case for efficient outcomes is not, however, a sufficient case for
markets, as markets themselves do not appear to play much of a role in the
story-they are little more than a black box that produces outcomes from the
signals fed into them. Moreover, if the only concern is efficiency, there is no
principled reason to prefer market transactions to state allocations
if the
23
analysis suggests that a tax or subsidy can improve matters.
Three other traditions in economics provide deeper insight into markets'
functioning and strengthen the case for water markets: Coasian transactions
cost economics, public choice theory, and Austrian economics. Ronald Coase,
who won the Nobel Prize in 1991, pioneered transaction costs analysis in two
25
24
landmark articles: The Nature of the Firm and The Problem ofSocial Cost.
In both, Coase highlighted the importance of transaction costs in explaining

19.

See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 18-20 (summarizing literature).

20.

See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NorING 113-14 (1997) (discussing the importance of

avoiding taxation's dead-weight losses in achieving taxation efficiency).
21. See SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 2-6.
22. Id. at 48.
23. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that the efficiency analysis, a "simple
but high-powered principle[,] not only explains how markets work but provides economists with a raison
d'etre when it comes to governmental planning").
24. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
25. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L & ECON. 1 (1960).
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why people organize their affairs in the ways we observe.26 In The Nature of
the Firm, for example, Coase contrasted the costs of organizing transaction in
the marketplace with the costs of organizing them in a hierarchical structure
(e.g., in firms). People choose between the firm and the market depending
on the relative transactions costs of the two forms of organization.28
Economists explaining those choices thus requires to understand the costs
imposed on transactions by the market and a subsequent comparison of those
costs to the costs of doing business within a firm.29 Similarly, in The Problem
of Social Cost, Coase examined the classic externality problem and
demonstrated that the problem stemmed not from the particular legal rules that
were thought to create the externality, but from the transaction costs that
prevented transacting around the outcome assigned by the law.3 ° One
implication of Coase's analyses is the importance of focusing on transaction
costs as a determinant of real world outcomes. A second implication is that
lowering transaction costs improves welfare by making possible alternative
transactions that would be deterred by higher transaction costs. The key
insight for the reader's purposes is the value of expanding the range of
possible market transactions as a means of improving outcomes.3
Public-choice analysis brings economic tools to bear on politics.
Pioneered by Nobel laureate James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in their
seminal work The Calculus of Consent,3 2 public choice explains how
individuals act in the political marketplace. 33 The key insights of publicchoice theory for our purposes lie in its rich understanding of the incentives
faced by politicians, bureaucrats, and voters.34 Politicians, however well
meaning and public-minded, can only affect policy if they are in office.35

26. See id. at 15-19; Coase, supra note 24, at 390-98.
27. Coase, supra note 24, at 390-98.
28. id. at 395-97.
29. Id. at 395 ("A firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra transaction within
the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open
market or the costs of organising in another firm."); see also IAN WILLS, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A SIGNALLING AND INCENTIVES APPROACH 68-69 (1997) (describing costs of operating in
markets). I make use of Wills's text as the primary source of general economic principles in this Article.
30. Coase, supra note 25, at 15-19.
31. BATE & TREN, supra note 4, at 36 ("Transaction costs play a major role in the context of water
resources allocation-where costs are high, allocation is inefficient. One aim of a water resources allocation
system is to lower TCs.").
32. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON R. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
33. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE I 1 (2003) ("Public choice can be defined as the
economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political science.")
34. Id.
35. Gordon Tullock, The Theory of Public Choice, in GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRUR INPUBLIC
CHOICE (Gordon Tullock et al. eds., 2002) ("The politician in a democratic society makes a living by
winning elections .... [P]olticians as businesspeople pursue policies that they think the people want
because they hope the people will reward them with votes."); James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner,
Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS 8-9 (1988) ("[P]olitical competition presents even the most public-spirited politician with a
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Bureaucrats, even with the best of intentions, can only implement policies if
their agencies receive resources from politicians and personally benefit from
advancing their careers.36 Thus, both must compete in the political
marketplace for influence, a process that inevitably entails compromises of
principle with interest groups able to deliver support.37 Voters remain
"rationally ignorant" of the details of most government activities, for while the
benefits of special interest lobbying are concentrated on a few, the costs
remain diffuse.38 For example, construction of a major federal water project
to deliver subsidized water generates enormous benefits to the water recipients
but costs each taxpayer only a few dollars.39
The third tradition in economic thought that enriches the understanding
of markets is Austrian economics. So called for its association with Carl
Menger, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich A.
Hayek (who won the Nobel Prize in 1974), all Austrians in both outlook and
nationality, Austrian economics is built on methodological individualism,
methodological subjectivism, and processes rather than analyses of end
states. 40 Methodological individualism requires a focus on the actions of
individuals; methodological subjectivism requires acceptance of individuals'
subjective valuations; and the focus on process requires attention to how
markets function rather than on comparative statics, as in the neoclassical
tradition. 4'
Making use of Coasian, public-choice, and Austrian analyses allows one
to make a far stronger case for water markets, and hence for market valuation
of water, than a neoclassical approach alone would permit. In this section I
draw on these traditions to set out four reasons why markets' valuation of
water, as well as other resources, is the appropriate means of doing so. In
large part, the argument here is that the issue for water is one of governance
institutions and that choice of the appropriate governance mechanism 42
rests on
an understanding of the incentives created by the chosen mechanism.

strong incentive to make decisions in light of electoral considerations.").
36. See Tullock, supra note 35, at 54-62 (summarizing public choice approach to bureaucracies);
Gwartney & Wagner, supra note 35, at 14-17 (also summarizing public choice approach to bureaucracies).
37. See Gwartney & Wagner, supra note 35, at 11-12 (describing rational ignorance).
38. Id. at 19.
39. See id. at 20-21.
40. See WOODS, supra note 1, at 19-20 (summarizing Austrian methods); Peter J. Boettke,
Introduction, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AuSTRIAN ECONOMICS 4 (Peter J. Boettke, ed., 1994).
(describing key features of Austrian school).
41. See Sanford Ikeda, Market Process,in THEELGAR COMPANIONTO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 24-25
(Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994) (describing market process theory and contrasting it to equilibrium analysis);
Israel Kirzner, Entrepreneurship, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 105 (Peter J.
Boettke ed., 1994) ("What sets the Misesian system apart from mainstream neoclassical economics is the
Misesian portrayal of the market as an entrepreneurially driven process.").
42. See, e.g., SEGERFELDT, supranote 4, at 16 (quoting a United Nations report that "The crisis is
one of water governance, essentially caused by the ways in which we mismanage water").
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A. Markets as Low Cost Signal Mechanisms
One of the most important lessons from Coase' s work is that transaction
costs matter with respect to how people organize their activities.43 Relative
transaction costs determine whether or not people choose to conduct a
transaction within a firm or in the marketplace and whether contracting around
an inefficient legal assignment of rights takes place. 4 The cost of transacting
is thus a critical component of any method of assigning value. Information
costs are an important part of transaction costs. 4 5 Transactions themselves are
also important sources of information because they provide information about
the parties' valuation of resources to others, giving them a means of assessing
the value of their own assets and the costs of possible projects they are
considering undertaking.
When we observe a market price, we have a remarkably compact source
of fairly dense information. The market price of a commodity summarizes in
a concise way (the price itself plus the terms at which the price is available) the
current valuation of the good being priced.' That valuation involves the
various uses of the good in question plus the alternative uses of the resources
used to make the good.47 Thus, for example, if it takes one unit of labor and
one unit of capital to produce one widget, the price of widgets will tell us
about the state of the market for widgets and also the state of the markets for
capital and labor. If other goods are more highly valued than widgets,
manufacturers of those goods will be able to bid capital and labor away from
manufacturers of widgets, and the price of widgets will rise as the supply falls.
One of the most important aspects of market pricing is that much of this
information is presented to us in a manner that does not make extensive
demands on our own information processing capabilities. 48 The price of
widgets and the movement of the price of widgets tells a great deal without
requiring the processing of information other than the price information about
widgets. Users of widgets, but also users of capital and labor, are all able to
43. See Coase, supra note 24, at 394-95.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Morriss et al., supranote 4, at 337 ("Information is costly to acquire and to process.");
Kerry Krutilla, EnvironmentalPolicy and Transactions Costs, in HANDBOOK OF ENvIORNmENTAL AND
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 249 (Jeroen C.J.M. Van Den Bergh ed., 1999) ("Neoclassical costs are incurred
whatever the status of agents' information sets whereas many, if not all, transactions costs arise from
informational imperfections and asymmetries. Hence imperfect information plays a crucial role in the
transactions sector of the economy.").
46. See WILLS, supra note 29, at 31 (describing the social coordination problem with providing
decision makers information on costs and benefits of production and consumption of goods and also
providing incentives to match supply with demand); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society,
35 AM. ECON. R. 519, 519-20 (1945).
47. See WLLs, supra note 29, at 31, 34.
48.

Esteban F. Thomsen, Prices and Knowledge, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN

ECONOMICS 167, 169 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994) ("Prices make it unnecessary that individuals become
informed of large numbers of facts.").
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learn from observing widget pricing, all without knowing much about each
other.49 When we move from widgets to water, the value of such a system is
even more important because of the importance of water to such a wide range
of uses. Understanding the alternative uses that water could be put to in a
particular situation would be a major undertaking. The ability of various
markets to summarize that information into an easy-to-comprehend number is
an important virtue.
Low cost transmission of information, particularly of complex
information, is valuable for several reasons. First, learning about the relative
scarcity of a resource is a transaction cost. 50 Lowering transaction costs
decreases the barriers to transactions; more transactions means more voluntary
trades take place; more voluntary trades produce more wealth, for trade
increases wealth. Increasing wealth is not only desirable in its own right but
also often increases demand for improved environmental quality.5' Second,
low cost transmission of information means that people will make use of more
information in their transactions than they would if information was more
expensive.52 They will thus be able to more accurately predict the outcome of
their transactions and bear less risk while transacting.5 3 To the extent that
people are risk averse,' and there is reason to believe that most people are risk
averse in most situations, reducing risk increases welfare.55 To the extent that
people are more certain of achieving their goals, they have to devote fewer
resources to hedging against uncertainties and so have more resources reserved
to devote to accomplishing their goals. Third, lowering the costs of
information allows more complex transactions because an important
component of the cost of complexity is the cost of information.56 More
complex transactions can more accurately accomplish individuals' objectives

49. The Austrian analysis reveals how this occurs:
Supply and demand is a process in which people pursue the diverse projects that interest them
in substantial ignorance of the projects that happen to interest others. When property rights are
reasonably clear and secure and participants are substantially free to exchange as they prefer,
supply and demand tends to become a process of mutual accommodation. When a good
becomes more scarce, the process will tend to produce a higher money price for the good insofar
as sellers who recognize conditions of excess demand find it in their interest to ask a higher
price. This higher price will in turn persuade demanders to economize on their use of the now
scarcer good and persuade suppliers to shift more of their resources into the provision of the
good.
Paul Heyne, Supply and Demand,in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AusTRIAN ECONOMICS 137, 138-39 (Peter
J. Boettke ed., 1994).
50. Thomsen, supra note 48, at 167-70.
51. See Sander M. de Bruyn & Roebijn J. Heintz, The EnvironmentalKuznets Curve Hypothesis,
in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMIcS 656 (Jeroen C.J.M. Van Den Bergh ed.,
1999) (describing literature and debate over existence of an environmental Kuznets curve).
52. See Thomsen, supra note 48, at 168-70.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., WILLS, supra note 29, at 233 (discussing the concept of risk aversion).
55.

See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 186-92 (1987).

56.

See Thomsen, supra note 48, at 168-70.
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because they tend to be more focused on the specific goal the individual seeks
to accomplish. In short, "[w]hen scarcity drives up the price of a resource,
users of the resource are motivated to find alternative sources of supply, new
technologies, or substitute resources.""7 Let us examine each of these in more
detail.
1. CheaperInformation Means More Transactions
Institutions that lower the cost of information increase the volume of
transactions by lowering the cost of transacting." The paradigmatic example
of today is the significant reduction in information costs produced by the
dramatic drop in telecommunications costs, brought about by a combination
of significant steps toward deregulation of telecommunications and the spread
of the internet as a means of communicating price information."
All else equal, more voluntary transactions increase social welfare
because individuals do not engage in these transactions unless the transactions
increase the welfare of the transacting parties. Thus, unless there is reason to
believe that the transactions impose uncompensated costs on third parties and
those costs are of the types that are recognized as compensable losses, a
greater volume of transactions not only increases net social welfare but is also
Pareto improving.' eBay is a clear example of how increasing the volume of
transactions increases social welfare.6" Using eBay, individuals with items to
sell have found a market for countless items that are valued more highly by
their buyers than by their previous owners.6 2 By broadening the market for
these items, eBay has increased the number of transactions possible.
eBay does this primarily through three market enhancements that lower
transaction costs. First, it lowers the search costs of finding items that buyers
want. Second, it provides a means of determining the quality of the buyer and
seller through its feedback mechanism. Third, through its PayPal subsidiary,
eBay lowers the transaction costs of making payments. All three of these
features within the eBay market reduce transaction costs and increase the
volume of transactions. Net social welfare increases as goods move to users
63
who value them more highly.

57.

ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 18.

58. See Thomsen, supranote 48, at 168-70.
59. Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation:Review and Synthesis,
8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 250 (1991).
60.

See Erik T. Verhoef, Externalities, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE

ECONOMICS 197, 198 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh ed., 1999) (noting that Pareto improvements are those
that make at least one person better off while making no one else worse off).
61. See generallyJames Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALEL.J. 1719, 1749(2005)
(describing the impact of eBay).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1740.
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Water is no different from Beanie BabiesTM in this regard. Suppose that
water in the hands of Smith is worth $0.25 per acre-foot, but in the hands of
Jones will be worth $1 per acre-foot. If a market exists in which Smith can
trade her water to Jones for a price between $0.25 and $1 per acre-foot, both
Smith and Jones can be made better off. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the
net gains possible in water markets are far greater than the value of water
rights by themselves. 64 One of the problems for Smith and Jones in the
absence of a market for water is that they lack the information needed to know
that the transaction is possible and that it will produce an increase in their own
welfare.65
In short, without a market, Smith and Jones do not know which of them
values the water more. 66 If we simply ask Smith and Jones to tell us how much
they value the water, with some administrative mechanism to award it to the
highest valued use, we have the problem of knowing whether Smith and Jones
are truthfully revealing their preferences.67 (Smith and Jones cannot be trusted
to honestly reveal their preferences unless dishonesty is costly.) 68 Further,
because most studies show that demand for water is price sensitive, Smith's
and Jones's preferences are themselves dependent on the cost of water.69
In the absence of a market, Smith and Jones are unable to compare their
values for the water in question.7" Smith wants to water her lawn; Jones wants
a drink. Which use is more valuable? If we do not use a market to allocate the
water between Smith and Jones, we need to resort to some alternative
mechanism. Nonmarket alternatives depend on a decision maker, who must
determine whether to give the resource to Smith or Jones. 7' The decision
maker must somehow learn about the relative preferences of Smith and Jones.
In the absence of knowledge about how the actual people Smith and Jones
value the water, the decision maker is forced to rely on generalities about
people like Smith and Jones. In general, we might conclude, people who want
to drink water value it more than people who want to water lawns; then one

64. SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 33.
65. See id. at 44-58.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 8-12 (summarizing literature and concluding that
there is substantial price sensitivity in water use); SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 63 (noting evidence that
water demand in mutual irrigation companies is more price sensitive than water demand in public irrigation
companies).
70. WOODS, supra note 1, at 21 ("Money prices allow incommensurable goods to be expressed in
terms of a common unit.").
71. We may simply have a legal rule that assigns the water to Smith and forbids transfers. But this
still involves a decision maker allocating it, for the legislature is free to change the rules and reallocate the
water to Jones. When it decides not to do so, it decides to leave the water with Smith. Thus, the case of a
rule allocating the water and forbidding transfers reduces to the case of an administrator allocating the water,
plus some additional transaction costs.
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can give an absolute priority to the drinkers over the lawn-watering users. But
not all people who want to drink water value it more than all lawn-watering
users-some people's thirst is already satiated, for example, and some lawns
bring considerable pleasure to many users (e.g., golf course greens used by
large numbers of golfers). Further, administrative allocations often rely on
crude proxies for use-value. Thus, residential users often pay the same price
for water they use for drinking and for watering their lawns, even though
watering a residential lawn would likely be a lower valued use than watering
a golf course (which brings pleasure to a larger number of people).
Sorting through the various users' valuations is costly for a decision
maker. Information must be gathered, weighed, and analyzed. The
truthfulness of responses must be considered. In addition, the decision maker
may be tempted to weigh considerations that he should not. Is Smith a
relative? Does the decision maker hope to go to work for Jones after leaving
his position of authority? Did Smith or Jones vote for the decision maker in
the last election? These considerations, which are unrelated to the value of
water, are often a factor in administrative allocations of resources. Guarding
against consideration of these factors is costly itself-it requires the public to
take a variety of steps that reduce the efficiency of the decision-making
process to ensure that verification that it was done legitimately.
However, if Smith is willing to sell to Jones, we know that Smith values
the water less than she values the alternative resources she can purchase with
the money Jones gives her in exchange for the water. If Jones is willing to pay
a price at which Smith is willing to sell, we know that Jones values the water
more than the resources he must give Smith to secure it. That Jones values the
water more than Smith when Jones buys it from Smith is a conclusion in which
we can have confidence because Smith and Jones have proven it to be true by
their actions. Markets thus provide information on relative valuations at low
cost.

72

Alternatives to markets are more costly in information terms than markets
because the alternatives require resources to learn people's preferences,
evaluate the truthfulness of the claimed preferences, and compare the
preferences.7 3 The additional costs of nonmarket allocations reduce the
number of transactions, and reducing the volume of transactions reduces net
wealth.74

72. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 192.
73. See id.at2l.
74. One caveat to the above is needed. Assume that the transactions that occur as a result of the
reduced information costs made possible by markets do not themselves produce compensable harms for
others. See id. at 140-41 (discussing the need to limit lawsuits to instances of actual damages). This
assumption is reasonable because if the transactions produced compensable harms, the victims would seek
compensation. The restriction of concern to compensable harms is important, for there are a variety of
harms that transactions may cause for which there is not only no compensation due but whose occurrence
is not recognized as a loss. These include losses in the marketplace as a result of competition by others.
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2. Cheaper Information Means More Information
When a good's price falls, people consume more of it.75 Information is
no different from other goods in this respect. Because markets convey
information more cheaply than do the alternative means of ordering the world,
people are able to make use of more information in their transactions than they
would otherwise.76 Having more information means that people are able to
have greater certainty about the outcome of their activities than they would
with less information. As a result, they bear less risk. Because risk-bearing
is generally a costly activity (which is why people pay insurance companies
to reduce their risk of loss), reducing uncertainty and risk through greater
information increases welfare.
Why do markets convey information cheaply? One important reason is
that markets convey information in a compact form. They reduce a wide
variety of information to a single number-the price-whose movements and
value are readily understood by market participants." If the price of a good
is rising, people get a clear signal that the resource is becoming more valuable;
if the price is falling, they receive a clear signal that the resource is becoming
less valuable. Moreover, as we move beyond spot markets, more complicated
financial instruments offer even more sophisticated signals. For example, if
there is a futures market in a given commodity, movements in the price of the
good today can be compared to the movements of the price at a future time.7"
As the spread between the future price and the current price changes, the
market conveys information about the expectations of market participants
about the future.79 Because there is good reason to believe that the collective
expectations about the future compiled in the results of markets are more
accurate than individual expectations, in part because they are based on a
wider information set, these markets are inexpensive, more accurate
alternatives to individuals' speculation about the resource's availability in the
future. 0
A second important reason that markets convey information cheaply is
that the existence of the market itself provides an incentive to lower
transaction costs.8 The existence of transaction costs provides entrepreneurs
If a competitor opens a store down the street and offers lower prices or better service and so lures away
customers, the competing store has been harmed, but the law does not recognize that harm as compensable.
The externality-based critique of markets are discussed below in more detail.
75. See id. at 7-10.
76. See id. at 24.
77. See id. at 8-10.
78. See id. at 192 ("As markets continue to operate, transaction costs fall, arbitrage increases,
brokers enter to connect willing buyers and willing sellers, and even futures markets develop.").
79. See id.; JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 245-47 (2004).
80. See generally SUROWIECKI, supra note 79, at 247 (explaining why many individuals are smarter
than a few experts).
81. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 23.
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with incentives to gain market advantages by reducing those CoStS. 82 Further,
differences in prices across markets give entrepreneurs an incentive to engage
in arbitrage, which ultimately eliminates the differences in prices (except for
differences due to the cost of the arbitrage itself).,3
We can observe the impact of this by examining financial markets, which
are among the most efficient markets known." For example, it takes a
remarkably short time for-new information to be fully reflected in market
prices on major stock markets." The result is that investors can depend on
financial market prices to give accurate signals about the value of goods, and
these signals can be used to construct strategies that reduce risk.86 Among the
most prominent examples of this is Southwest Airlines's successful jet fuel
price hedging strategy.87 This strategy enables Southwest to reduce its
vulnerability to increases in fuel costs by buying financial instruments that pay
off if jet fuel prices rise, thus offsetting the higher price it must pay for jet
fuel. 8
How might this affect water markets? One major question for many
water users is whether water will be available in the future to meet projected
needs. Farmers, for example, benefit from knowing if they will have access
to water to irrigate their crops before they make planting decisions.
Recreational water users, and the businesses that profit from selling them
ancillary services, benefit from knowing whether sufficient water is going to
be available for a time period for which they wish to plan recreation.
Predicting future water availability requires predicting weather, something for
which science has not yet developed highly accurate methods of long range
prediction. Water markets would bring the same market mechanisms to water
availability as are currently available on commodity markets for many crops.89
Not only would water users be able to hedge using water futures as they do
now on other forms of futures, but the predictive accuracy of a large number
of water users would likely be greater than the nonmarket predictions of
scientists alone.

82. See id. at 23-24.
83. See Jonathan R. Macey, AdministrativeAgency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:
A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 909, 927 (1994).
84. See id. at 927-28.
85. See id. ("There is virtually complete consensus about the fact that market forces impound
information sufficiently fast that the arbitrage possibilities presented by new information disappear
incredibly quickly, often in milliseconds.").
86. See, e.g., Susan Warren & Susan Carey, Southwest Air's Profit Soars as JetBlue's Descends,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2005, at B2.

87. Id.
88. Id. (noting importance of hedging strategy to profits).
89. See Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and
Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1096, 1102-03 (2000) (describing development and use of
futures contracts in agriculture, including for hedging).
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Further, information is critical to monitoring the performance of an
institution. 90 Because information on the performance of water firms is
available more cheaply than is information on the performance of nonmarket
water institutions, monitoring the behavior of the firms is cheaper than
monitoring the behavior of the nonmarket institutions. 9' Unsurprisingly, many
state-sector water institutions have suffered from administrative problems
related to the lack of ability to effectively monitor their performance. 92 Indeed,
public-sector water institutions routinely fail at one of the most basic
information-related tasks-monitoring water use.93 This failure is not simply
a failure of technology or competence, it is a failure caused by improper
incentives. 94
3. CheaperInformation Means More Complex Transactions
When information is cheaper, transactions become more complex as well
as more numerous. More complex transactions allow individuals to
accomplish their goals more precisely, lowering transaction costs, reducing
uncertainty, and increasing net welfare. Transactions become more complex
when information is cheaper because complexity depends, in part, on
information. If all I know about a commodity is one aspect of it (e.g.,
quantity), then the transactions in which I can engage in is limited to
exchanges of different amounts of the commodity. If, however, I know more
aspects (e.g., the date and time of delivery), I can vary pricing depending on
the date and time of delivery as well as based on quantity.
A simple example of the more complex transactions made possible by
cheaper information is the sale of electricity. 95 If electricity is metered solely
based on quantity, utilities can sell electricity only based on the quantity
consumed. 96 Because electricity generation costs vary significantly with the
amount of demand for electricity at the time of generation (e.g., peak capacity
generally costs more than base capacity), a more complex meter that measured
when the electricity was consumed would allow the utility to charge lower
prices for nonpeak electricity sales than for peak sales. 97 This sends consumers

90. See, e.g., SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 21-23.
91. See, e.g., id. at 21-26.
92. See, e.g., id. at 21-22 (Water bureaucracies in poor countries "tend to display weaknesses in
everything from lack of competence and administrative acumen to political control and perverse incentive
structures. On top of this, water policy is excessively centralized, both politically and administratively.").
93. See, e.g., id. at 23 ("[1]n most developing countries with public water supplies, metering works
badly.").
94. Id.
95. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall
of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 1, 124 (2004) (discussing real time pricing and
metering).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 124-25.
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a valuable signal about the costs of use at different times of day.98 Slightly
more complex metering equipment gives the utility the ability to control
electricity-using equipment in the user's facility and allows the utility to
manage demand. 99 Typically, these contracts offer the user a discount in return
for the inconvenience of conceding control of particular energy-using items to
the utility.'0°
Water has a wide range of attributes that affect users differently. For
example, consider the flow of water in a river. A unit of water in the river
during a wet season has a different marginal value to the ecosystem of the river
than a unit during a dry season.'"' A water system's capacity introduces issues
similar to those in electricity delivery, with peak-time water costing more than
off-peak water."°2 Water quality also varies in a wide range of dimensions. 3
Water allowed to stay in a river has different impacts on downstream users
than water removed from a river for use, even if the water is ultimately
returned downstream). 4 Water moved by a user from one watershed to
another has different impacts than water returned to the watershed from which
it was initially drawn. 10 5 It is not difficult to imagine a series of complex
transactions involving water that could take place if these attributes were
capable of being incorporated into markets.' °6 For example, recreational
fishermen, activist groups concerned with preserving an ecosystem, and
tourism organizations could combine to purchase rights to maintain minimum
stream flows from agricultural users. 7 The agricultural users could, in turn,
buy futures contracts that allowed them to hedge against low water levels that
prevented drawing out water for irrigation due to the stream flow contracts.
The resulting transaction would be far more complex than a simple transfer of
the right to a particular quantity of water. These contracts could offer
significant gains for all parties.
Historical evidence supports the idea that markets enable more complex
transactions concerning water. During the nineteenth century, a large number
of mutual irrigation companies were formed in the American West.0 8

98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 18 (recounting Tucson, Arizona's experience with
pricing and rationing to reduce peak demand for water by twenty percent).
102. See id.
103.
104.

See id.at 82.
See id.

105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 124-30 (discussing innovative contracts for instream flows); see also id. at 200-01
(discussing Environmental Defense's plan "to use revenues from increased hydroelectric production to pay
irrigators to reduce their consumptive use and return water to the system" for instream flows).
108. See id. (describing experience of mutual irrigation companies).
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By using members' assets as collateral, mutuals could enter capital markets
to obtain the investment funds necessary to develop irrigation projects. The
transferability of stocks ensured that water could be moved to higher valued
alternatives, further ensuring the success of the operation. These features,
combined with the security of rights provided by the doctrine of
appropriation, stimulated an effective marketplace."°

In more recent times, entrepreneurs have discovered ways to reduce
wastewater treatment costs through markets and complex transactions
involving multiple parties." I Others have found ways to extend water
treatment systems without burdening municipal governments."' By allowing
more complex transactions, markets improve economic well-being.
B. Markets as Dynamic Signal Mechanisms
One of the most important aspects of markets is their dynamic nature.
Market prices respond to events quickly, sending market participants signals
about the impact of events on the goods and services sold in markets. As
discussed earlier, by monitoring market prices, including futures prices, an
individual is able to learn a considerable amount about the likely course of
events even without studying the underlying information driving the changes
in market prices." 2 "The entrepreneur who discovers a higher valued use for
water, for example, stands to gain from transferring his water to the higher
valued use."'" 3 Markets are thus institutions that encourage individuals to
adapt to changed circumstances. "' Higher prices encourage new firms to enter
an industry, expanding supply." 5 Operating without these signals, public
water companies often under-provide service." 6 The critical element in

109. Id. at 40-41.
110. Morriss et al., supra note 4, at 345-46 (discussing contracting between point and nonpoint
sources that reduced treatment costs from $50-100 million to $12 million in Tar-Pamlico River Basin); id.
at 350-51 (discussing Shaeffer International's innovative treatment program for multiple waste streams).
11.
DVD: 2005 Texas Tech Law Review Water Symposium (on file with author). John Rapier's
discussion at the symposium highlighted some of these types of transactions.
112. Thomsen, supra note 48, at 170 ("Prices translate situations of ignorance in the market into
profit opportunities and thus provide the incentive for their elimination.").
113. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 23.
114. Richard L. Stroup, FreeRidersand CollectiveAction Revisited, 4 INDEP. REV. 485,489 (2000).
As Richard Stroup summarizes,
Entrepreneurship is a key to efficiency in a world where technology and relative prices change
rapidly. Private firms are constantly adjusting their own organizations to handle changing
problems and opportunities. For them the carrot is profit; the stick is failure to survive under
competition. Feedback to them from the product market tends to be constant.
Id.
115. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 11; see also id. at 12-13 (noting historical evidence in
the American West of entrepreneurs entering water business).
116. SEGERFEI DT, supra note 4, at 23 (asserting "a public authority lacks incentives for reaching as
many users possible").
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creating the dynamic signaling properties of markets is that markets force
individuals to face the opportunity costs of their actions." 7
An opportunity cost is the cost of what a resource owner foregoes by not
taking an action. If one hundred acre-feet of water can be used to irrigate a
cotton field and produce a net benefit to the water owner of two dollars per
acre-foot or used to irrigate a fifty percent less water-intensive crop and the
surplus sold for three dollars per acre-foot, the cotton farmer's opportunity cost
of not changing to the less water- intensive crop is fifty dollars. If net total
value of water sales and crop sales from the alternative crop exceeds the net
total value of the cotton crop, and the cotton farmer does not know about the
possibility, an entrepreneur will be able to bid more for the farmer's land than
the farmer currently earns by taking into account the knowledge of the
potential for shifting crops and selling the surplus water." 8 Recognizing
opportunity costs requires transferable property rights, for a water rights owner
who cannot transfer rights will never be able to consider the full opportunity
costs of her actions, as others with alternative uses for the water rights will
have no incentive to approach her with a proposed transfer." 9
Markets are also dynamic signal mechanisms because they incorporate
new knowledge rapidly. When new information becomes available,
entrepreneurs quickly make use of it, spreading the knowledge to others
through the entrepreneurs' behavior. For example, if new data reveals that
soybean harvests in China are likely to be poorer than expected, those with the
data will seek to purchase soybean futures, knowing that the market price for
soybeans will rise as the Chinese harvest data become known. The rising price
of soybean futures will provide information to those completely ignorant of
Chinese soybean production estimates, enabling them to learn from the
information uncovered by the specialists.
Market prices quickly incorporate new information about how consumers
will use a good. For example, the development of portable electronic devices
such as the iPod and more advanced cell phones has increased demand for a
particular kind of memory chip (NAND flash memory).' 20 Information about
the increasing demand for these chips in new markets affects the price of
chips, as well as the price of stock in companies that manufacture the chips.
Because chips and company stocks have markets, the markets provide
feedback to manufacturers of various chips, manufacturers of devices that use
chips, investors about the opportunity costs of using the different types of

117. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 23 ("Responsibility for opportunity costs is crucial.").
118. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 192-93; SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 31
(describing shifts in agricultural water use as a result of water markets in Chile).
119.

ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 24.

120. See Yun-Hee Kim, Flash-Memory-Chip SharesSkid on Intel-MicronThreat, WALL ST. ONLINE
(Nov. 22, 2005).
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chips, and the effectiveness of business strategies of chip producers and chip
consumers.
Administrative allocations, which either forbid transfers outright or which
depend on seeking regulatory approval, interfere with dynamic signaling.
Prohibitions on formal transfers can eliminate the dynamic signaling by
effectively stopping transfers.' 2 ' The prohibitions can also reduce the
effectiveness of the signals by driving the transactions underground and
reducing the potential for gains by allocating gains to those able to block the
transfer.'22
Water use is a field in which new information regularly appears. We now
123
know much more about the value of instream uses than we did in the past,
and we are now able to measure water quality both more accurately and in
more dimensions than we did in the past. The information about the impact of
water uses on downstream users is growing; for example, more sophisticated
measurements make it possible to measure the return flows from irrigation
and, so to more accurately calculate the impact of an upstream use on
downstream water users making dynamic information about water available
to water users, and incorporating that information into water use rights and
contracts, offers the potential for significant gains from trade increases as a
result of incorporating more information on a dynamic basis into water
transactions.
C. Market Incentives to Create New Knowledge
Markets create opportunities to profit by developing new knowledge
about both goods traded in the market and market conditions. When a market
participant discovers new information, she has the opportunity to profit by
making use of it. As a result, markets encourage investment in information. As
Segerfeldt notes, "[a] private firm competing with other firms for the
customers' favor must always be devising new and better methods and must
' 24
be as efficient as possible."'

With Roger Meiners and Andrew Dorchak, I have argued elsewhere that
the General Mining Law of 1872, which awards mineral resources and the
121. See, e.g., SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 24 (A weakness of public sector water institutions is
their inability "as a rule to anticipate needs and demand. They cannot take in the myriad of signals about
prices, demand, and changes in customers' habits and preferences the way private players operating in a
market can.").
122. Id.
123. In the nineteenth century "[t]he only instream use of any consequence was navigation [but] over
time, the demand for instream uses grew to include hydropower generation, waste disposal, and recreation."
ANDERSON & SNYDER, supranote 4, at 111.
124. SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 24. Market solutions "leave room for a flexible response to
environmental demands of society, mobilizing the (search for) knowledge of technological feasibilities and
local physical constraints of individual economic agents to accommodate their polluting activities to
particular environmental policy goals." Dietz & Vollebergh, supranote 2, at 339.
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associated surface estates to those who discover the resources on federal lands,
creates an incentive to invest in knowledge about mineral resources. 125 The
literature on the incentives for innovation created by patent law's award of
intellectual property rights is substantial. 126 These examples are clear
demonstrations of the power of property rights and markets to provide
incentives for the investments necessary to produce knowledge.
Applied to water, the incentive to create knowledge is likely to produce
investment in four areas. First, if holders of existing water rights are freed to
market their rights, we should discover entrepreneurs investing in new
technology to maximize the value of the rights. Indeed, where waste exists so
does an entrepreneurial opportunity. 27 A more efficient use of water in
agriculture, for example, can free a portion of an existing allocation for new
uses.1 28 Someone who invents a more efficient method of irrigation can thus
create value for existing agricultural water users by allowing them to market
a portion of their water without reducing their agricultural production.' 29
Second, entrepreneurs will invest in new sources of water. When we
consider that water sources include reducing waste, recycling used water,
developing greater understanding of hydrology, to allow water users who add
water back into systems to receive credit for their inputs against their
withdrawals, we can see that new sources of water need not be simply new
wells. 3 ° New sources of water exist, for only a very small percentage of the
world's supply of fresh water is consumed by humans.' 3 ' Indeed, outside of
a relatively few areas, we face only an economic scarcity, not a physical
13 2
scarcity, of water.
Third, there will be investment in alternatives to water use. Reducing use
is not simply a matter of low-flow shower heads and front-loading washing
machines. For example, water markets that fully price water use will likely

125. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free Access Under the General
Mining Law of 1872, 34 ENVTL. L. 745 (2004).
126. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Functionof the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977).
127. Morriss et al., supra note 4, at 343.
128. See id.
129. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 11.
In motivating agricultural consumers to reduce consumption through improved irrigation
techniques and modified cropping patterns, higher water prices would free up irrigation water
for municipal and other uses. It is estimated that if 5 percent of agricultural water were
transferred to municipal use, the needs of urban areas in the western United States would be met
for the next 25 years.
Id.
130. David Zilberman & Leslie Upper, The Economics of Water Use, in HANDBOOK OF
ENViRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 141 (Jeroen C.J.M. Van Den Bergh ed., 1999) (noting that
"[a] major source of inefficiency in water management is losses from conveyance systems").
131. SEGERFELDT, supranote 4, at 13 (noting estimates range from 6.8% to 8% of water used).
132. Id. at 15; see also ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 1-7 (summarizing shortage of
literature).
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lead to a decreased use of landscaping plants that require large amounts of
water in arid areas. An entrepreneur who can find the appropriate mix of
incentives and contracts to convince a developer to reduce landscaping water
demands creates substantive value by reducing the water costs associated with
the development. The prevalence of fountains and nonxeroscaped landscaping
in growing arid areas like Phoenix, for example, is readily explained by the
absence of a market for water. Similarly, other factors of production will be
substituted for water in response to higher prices. 33 A dramatic example of
this is the change in water used in steel production: from two hundred metric
tons of water per metric ton of steel in 1930 to twenty metric tons of water
today, with some steel manufacturers using only three to four metric tons of
water to produce a metric ton of steel." 3 Similarly, agricultural uses vary
considerably with respect to their demand for water, and farmers can readily
shift to less water-intensive crops and more efficient irrigation techniques if
they have the opportunity to profit from water sales.'35 Water companies will
reduce waste in transmission if water becomes more valuable.3 6 "The point
is that many choices are available
to water consumers and they will respond
' 137
rationally to water prices."
Finally, one of the most critical problems with respect to water is simply
the lack of adequate investment in producing and distributing safe water. 3 It
is not that we lack the knowledge of how to physically deliver water to those
who lack it; what we lack is the knowledge of how to do so in an economically

133. Water critics seem to confuse the importance of water to life with its economic functions. See,
e.g., SHIVA, supra note 4, at 15 ("Over-exploitation of water and disruption of the water cycle create
absolute scarcity that markets cannot substitute with other commodities."). Similarly, at the Texas Tech
Symposium, Maude Barlow criticized Coca-Cola for using three gallons of water to make one gallon of
Coke. DVD 2005 Texas Tech Law Review Water Symposium (on file with author). Water has many uses
for which there are substitutes. Thus, one reason that some Coca-Cola bottlers use more than one unit of
water to make a unit of soda is that they must clean the equipment between batches of different sodas. As
Harry Ott of Coca-Cola confirmed to me at the conference, there are substitutes for some of this water use,
including switching production runs less frequently or having more than one set of production equipment
to eliminate the need for switching. Thus, there are substitutes for particular uses of water.
134.

SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 16; see also ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 9 tbl. 1.1

(summarizing the different water needs of various industries).
135. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 10-11 (citing studies that showed that as water prices
increased, farmers substituted less water-intensive crops); Zilberman & Upper, supra note 130, at 147
(noting conservation incentives created by higher prices). Shiva argues that "[b]y failing to recognize water
as a limiting factor in food production, industrial agriculture has promoted waste." SHIVA, supra note 4, at
108. This claim, like many made in the antimarket literature, rests on a profound misunderstanding of
current water institutions. What Shiva is observing is more likely the absence of markets, in which
politically powerful agricultural interests have secured subsidized water. For example, Shiva cites the
example of "sugar barons" in Maharashtra opposing the diversion of water from sugar production. Id. at
125. The sugar barons are not operating in a market when they threaten that "a canal of blood will flow"
if they do not receive their water, for there is no market mechanism to create "canal[s] of blood." Id.
(quoting Vandana Shiva, ECOLOGY AND THE POLMCS OF SURVIVAL (1991)).
136. SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 31-32 (noting this reaction in Chile in response to privatization).
137. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 11.
138.

SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 15.
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feasible way. 3 9 Entrepreneurs who discover reduced cost means of creating

and maintaining the infrastructure necessary to produce and deliver clean, safe
water can profit from doing so.
D. Markets Tolerate Diverse Ends
A significant advantage of markets over alternative means of valuing and
allocating goods is that markets do not require a social agreement on the
values of the uses to which people plan to put the goods they purchase in the
marketplace." 4 This reduces the conflicts over whether the appropriate4ends
have been selected as high value uses in nonmarket allocation systems.' 1
For example, agricultural and residential uses are often in competition for
water resources. 142 In the absence of a market for transfers, agricultural water
rights holders who lose their rights due to a reallocation to residential uses are
not compensated by the residential users. The agricultural users thus suffer a
loss and the residential users receive something of value. Both groups are thus
likely to expend resources in the attempt to, respectively, block or facilitate the
reassignment. 43 Economists refer to this as rent seeking and rent seeking
leads to dissipation of the gains through political competition; for the money
spent to capture the rents benefits no one-except the lobbyists and lawyers
involved-and creates no value. ' Whether the transfer will occur depends
in part on some socially agreed upon relative valuation of agricultural and
residential uses. 14 If the society is a democratic one, making relative valuation
decisions politically is costly and increases conflicts between agricultural and
urban interest groups. '4 If the society is not democratic, the decision is
possibly cheaper (it may be simply asking what the dictator regards as the
appropriate outcome), but even less likely to depend on appropriate criteria,
for the decision will have an impact on the regime's ability to maintain itself
in power.

139. See id. at 18.
140. See id. at 43-44.
141. Id. at 40. For example, an Israeli environmental scientist argues that transforming water rights
into a market between Israel and the Palestinian Authority reduced tensions "[I]f you monetize the conflict,
it makes it less emotional." Id.
142. See id. at 48.
143. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 25-28 (describing rent seeking in water allocation).
144. See Krutilla, supra note 45, at 252-53 (describing rent seeking problems in environmental
policy); see also MCCIsNEY, supra note 20, at 124-31 (describing rent seeking generally).
145. See Krutilla, supra note 45, at 261-67.
146. See id.
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E. Summary
Markets for water rights hold the potential to unleash significant
entrepreneurial activity on water. We need many additional entrepreneurs to
focus on water because more than a billion people lack access to clean and safe
water-a number that "has held constant for decades."' 147 We should expect
to see water rights evolve in such an environment into a more complex bundle
than recognized by the limited efforts at creating water markets we have seen
thus far. 48 Water rights will acquire quality, temporal, and other
characteristics, all of which will allow a wide range of transactions not
currently possible. We cannot fully anticipate what these transactions will
look like, for we do not have the information necessary to do so. But we do
know that decentralized free markets can more effectively make use of
information than even the most sophisticated administrative mechanism.
Unless there are significant problems with markets, these advantages should
create a presumption in favor of reliance on markets.
II. CRMCISMS OF WATER MARKETS IN PERSPECTIVE
We rely on comparatively unregulated markets for a wide range of goods
and services, including critical ones such as food and housing. As Anderson
and Snyder note, "Water certainly is necessary for life. But clothing and
shelter are also necessities, and there is no justification for having governments
control their allocation.', 149 The mere identification of a good as a necessity
is thus insufficient to take it out of the marketplace.' 0 Where there are
government actions that impede the free movement of goods and services, we
generally demand that the intervention be justified by reference to some
market failure and a showing that the alternative, interventionist approach has
a superior outcome to the market.' 5' In other words, there are institutional
failures in government as well as in markets, and a sensible approach is to
compare the potential institutions to see which is the least problematic. 5 '

SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 1.
148. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 44. Water rights did so during the nineteenth
century in much of the American West. Id. ("The evolution of water law on the Great Plains was a response
to the benefits and costs of defining and enforcing rights to a valuable resource."); Morriss et al., supra note
4, at 865-88.
149. Id.
150. See Coase, supra note 25, at 43. Moreover, those who wish to remove one necessity from the
marketplace but not others bear the burden of identifying a principled distinction that explains the different
results. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
[V]ery little analysis is required to show that an ideal world is better than a state of laissez faire,
unless the definitions of a state of laissez faire and an ideal world happen to be the same. But
the whole discussion is largely irrelevant for questions of economic policy since whatever we
147.
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Although there are multiple market interventions that do not ultimately pass
this test, as well as a large literature that explains such interventions in terms
of special interests, the standard for justifying use of nonmarket allocations is
generally accepted to be identification of a market failure larger than the
53
corresponding interventionist institution's failure.1
Are there major market failures likely in the case of water markets?
54
There are certainly many people who are strongly opposed to water markets,1
including many economists.'55 The primary complaints about water markets
in the literature concern the alleged existence of externalities, the existence of
a natural monopoly in water provision, and questions about the affordability
of water rights for the poor. Do any of these concerns suggest that an
alternative to water markets is superior?
A. Externalities
Externalities exist when there are attributes of a good that are not priced
and so are not considered by that decision makers using market information.'56
For example, suppose in-stream flows produce habitat for fish. Because the
affected fish are unlikely to be market participants directly, the fish-habitat
aspect of the in-stream flow characteristic of water may not be a characteristic
for which there is market demand.' 57 Many water policy analysts opposed to
markets contend that these externalities are pervasive, 58 while market
proponents find that externalities "are overused as an argument for
governmental intervention in water markets."'5 9 However, the issue is not

may have in mind as our ideal world, it is clear that we have not yet discovered how to get to it
from where we are.
Id.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 2 ("Googling for 'water privatization' on the Internet
yields 1,750,000 hits, many concerning various kinds of opposition to the involvement of commercial
interests in water supply. And indeed there have been violent protests and demonstrations against water
privatization all over the world.").
155. BATE & TREN, supra note 4, at 35 ("Economic theorists, originating with Samuelson, (1954),
and Bator, (1958), have provided the theoretical support for political control of water. They have argued
that public control of resources such as water is advisable if monopoly power and externalities from markets
are not to lead to allocation problems.").
156. WiLLs, supra note 29, at 63 (Externalities "are consequences (benefits or costs) of actions
(consumption, production or exchange) that are not borne by the decision maker, and hence do not influence
his or her actions."). See generally Verhoef, supra note 60, at 199-205 (discussing the issue of externalities
in environmental policy).
157. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 19 (summarizing externality critique).
158. See id. at 19-20, 76-78 (giving examples); SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 76 ("Privatization
protesters usually argue that privatization will harm the environment, not help it. But it seems very hard for
them to find evidence of this."); SIUVA, supra note 4, at 6 ("The deepening ecological crisis. . . is making
it imperative that nature's values and functions be taken into account through proper ecological audits that
assign value to natural functions.").
159. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 52.

996

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:973

whether there is an externality but how big of an externality there is in relation
to the externalities caused by alternative institutions. Consider, for example,
the Aral Sea-perhaps the largest water allocation environmental disaster in
modem times."W The destruction of the Aral Sea resulted from the
misallocation of water resources by the Soviet bureaucracy, the antithesis of
16
a market allocation.'
There are several responses to a claim that these problems are significant
in the case of water markets that go to the issue of whether the class of
problems is actually likely to cause trouble in water markets. First, there is a
real question about the magnitude of such problems. In many instances,
unpriced attributes of a good are related to other priced attributes. For
example, game fish species are highly valued by sport fishermen and
businesses that cater to sport fishermen. Maintaining in-stream flows for sport
fish also maintains the flows for nonsport fish. And, to the extent the nonsport fish are part of the same ecosystem as the sport fish, maintaining a
healthy ecosystem for the sport fish often provides an ecosystem for the
nonsport fish as well. Simply showing that a fish exists which has insufficient
utility for human use such that there will not be a market demand for providing
that fish with sufficient water is thus not enough to show that a market-based
water allocation scheme would produce an externality.
Second, even if a fish species possessed attributes such that there was no
market demand for providing it with sufficient water to survive, one need not
do away with water markets to solve the problem. By introducing a market
actor with a budget and a mission to protect these species, we can create a
demand for this previously unpriced attribute without disrupting the other,
beneficial aspects of water markets.
Third, many external effects are the result of efficiency-enhancing
transactions, and so are not effects that count. 62 Thus, for example, if Smith
sells Jones some water rights, Jones's competitor Black may be harmed in the
marketplace by Jones's new water rights. 6 3 "Naturally the third parties would
like to restrict competition" by prohibiting the transfer. 64 However, such
harms are not only not compensable but are a vital part of improving the

160. See SHIVA, supra note 4, at 111-12.
161. See Tom Bissell, Eternal Winter: Lessons of the Aral Sea Disaster, HARPER'S, Apr. 1, 2002,
at 41. Bizarrely, Shiva cites the Aral Sea disaster as a criticism of markets. SHIVA, supranote 4, at 1I 1-12.
Her argument appears to be that the problem arose because of Soviet "industrial farming" and that this
farming is somehow a market phenomenon. Id. at 112. The Soviet economy, however, was not a market
economy. Of course, a market could never produce the Aral Sea disaster because the cost of acquiring the
rights necessary through voluntary transactions would far exceed the benefits of the project. Only a
government can create a disaster of this magnitude, for only a government can seize property rights on such
a scale without paying compensation.
162. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 84-85.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 85.
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standard of living generally. 65 In short, we should not, and do not,
compensate buggy-whip manufacturers when cars are invented, and that same
principle applies to water markets.
Fourth, there simply may not be many of these external effects. " There
is considerable concern about the impact on agricultural communities of large
scale water transfers to urban users, usually based on the high prices cities are
willing to pay for water rights. 67 These concerns, however, neglect to
consider that those prices are offered for the first, most highly valued units of
water that the city will buy. 6 ' It is unlikely that these high prices will be
offered for all the units. Moreover, the low return many farmers receive for
their water use is based on their current total use. Because they would sell the
lowest marginal value water rights first, farmers' returns would rise as the
urban marginal demand falls, making it unlikely that as much water would
shift as the initial price gap might suggest."
These qualifications reduce the number of externality concerns with
which we must be concerned, but they do not eliminate all externality concerns
about water markets. Consider how significant these are likely to be.
An externality exists when the producers and consumers in a market do
not consider some attribute of a market transaction which, they did not
consider it, would produce a different outcome (e.g., preventing the
transaction, changing the price, etc.). Note that external effects that do not
change the outcome are irrelevant to the analysis because considering them
would not produce a different outcome.
How often is the above true of water markets? It is certainly the case that
there are aspects of water use that are not considered by the participants in a
market transaction. For example, there may be impacts of withdrawing water
at a particular time and place on the water system's ecosystem which are
unknown. By definition, therefore, market participants cannot take these
considerations into account because no one knows of the impacts' existence.
Of course, if they are unknown, they will not be considered by them either.
There may be other impacts, however, known to the scientific community but
not to the market participants. Suppose such an impact exists, how might the
market respond?
Those who know about the impact might bring it to the attention of the
market participants. If the previously unknown impact has an economic value,
an opportunity now exists for an entrepreneur to create a new transaction that
takes the previously unknown impact into account. For example, if knowledge
of the value of in-stream flows on a commercially valuable sport fish is

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 85-86.
See id.
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discovered, an entrepreneur could repackage the water transfer, causing the
transfer to include guarantees of maintaining the necessary in-stream flows,
together with appropriate hedging instruments to cover losses from
interrupting the transfer, if conditions require doing so, to maintain the instream flows. The entrepreneur would profit by selling the new package to
those who benefit from the preservation of the game fish. Of course, that group
may be a dispersed set of fishing enthusiasts who are costly to contract with,
Even in such cases, there may be alternative contracting parties that solve the
free-rider problem. 70 All well and good, but sometimes these transactions
may not occur because the transactions costs are simply too high. In these
cases, markets will fail to provide a response capable of ensuring that all bad
outcomes do not occur. This is certainly true, but all institutions suffer from
such problems. We cannot demand perfection from any institution or we are
doomed to disappointment. The question is thus:
Do markets fare better or
71
worse than alternative allocation mechanisms?
In the case of knowledge that is not widely dispersed (the case above) and
for which transaction costs prevent an entrepreneur from creating a contractual
solution, any alternative allocation method is likely to have similar
difficulties.'72 If the knowledge is not widely held, there is little reason to
believe that the political system will incorporate the knowledge into
administrative solutions, for without dissemination of the knowledge there
would be little political reward from undertaking to make use of the
knowledge. 173 Moreover, if the group that might be willing to contract for a
solution (e.g., fishing enthusiasts) is so dispersed that no contractual solution
is possible, then the possibility is even less likely that a political solution will
appear that overcomes the problems of aggregating preferences through the
political system, problems that are significantly larger than the problems of
aggregating preferences through the market. 74 We thus have little reason to
believe that administrative or political alternatives to markets
will be more
7
1
externalities.
such
with
dealing
in
markets
than
successful
170. Ducks Unlimited is an example of a successful private effort to save sufficient wetlands to use
for migration purposes and ensure migratory waterfowl can successfully migrate. Similar groups include
Trout Unlimited and The Nature Conservancy. See id. at 113-14. Similarly, English fishermen banded
together in associations to protect water quality. Roger Bate, Saving Our Streams: The Role of the Anglers'
Conservation Association in Protecting English and Welsh Rivers, 14 FORDHAM ENvrL. L.J. 375 (2003).
171. See BATE & TREN, supra note 4, at 36.
172. Stroup, supra note 114, at 498 ("The same factors that make one sector weak may
simultaneously weaken an alternative sector.").
173. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 21 ("Those who call for command-and-control as an
improvement over markets fail to recognize that incentives and information problems must be overcome
in both private and political arenas.").
174. Id. ("[Sluppliers in the public sector sell their products to the entire citizenry, which expresses
its demand through special-interest groups as well as elections... [where] the link between demand and
supply is much less clear.").
175. Indeed, we have good reason to think that precisely the opposite will be true, for the record of
state institutions in water projects is problematic. See SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 19-20. The quality of
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The issue with respect to externality claims is first to identify a reason to
believe that nonmarket institutions will be more likely than markets to identify
and correct the externality. Because both identification and correction are
information-intensive activities, the likelihood that a nonmarket alternative can
do so at a lower transaction cost than the market is dependent on the
nonmarket institution handling information at a lower cost than the market.
And non-market institutions must do so "without the benefit of information
contained in market prices.' 76 As discussed earlier, however, markets excel
at low cost information processing, relative to other institutions. 77 Moreover,
for a nonmarket institution to be preferable to a market also depends on the
non-market alternative presenting a less costly method for resolving an
externality problem than the alternative of introducing a new participant into
the market (e.g., funding an organization of sporting enthusiasts to acquire instream rights). 78 When considered against the cases in which markets
outperform nonmarket institutions, the class of externalities where nonmarkets outperform markets would have to be either extremely high value or
quite numerous to give the nonmarket alternative the advantage. 179 We lack
evidence of either extraordinarily high value or numerous externalities as the
externality critique does not provide a sufficient theoretical basis to set aside
the presumption in favor of voluntary transactions.
B. Natural Monopolies
It is frequently claimed that water or various water projects constitute a
"natural monopoly. '' tan As a result the supply of water will be controlled in
each area by a single firm, which will then charge monopoly prices that harm
consumers.'' (Somewhat paradoxically, market critics response to this often
to suggest a state monopoly.)
There are two important flaws in this claim. First, the existence of a
natural monopoly in any particular aspect of a water system does not justify

public investment programs, in addition to inadequate amounts invested,
is a problem of at least the same magnitude [as the quantity]. Third World public water
investments are often characterized by huge dam projects, financed as a rule with a combination
of development aid and national government revenue. Usually these projects are poorly
designed, shoddily built, and badly managed, so the outcome is far worse than anticipated.

Id.
176.
177.

ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 21.
WLis, supra note 29, at 42-45 (discussing information demands of planning solutions and

concluding that planning is superior to markets for valuation only when "signaling of values is costless and
either: [(1)] consumers and producers tell the truth; or [(2)] planners mimic the market to determine the
valuations and appropriate quantities of goods").
178. See id.

179.

See id.

180.
181.

See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 50-52 (summarizing the literature).
Id.
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the creation of a state monopoly on the entire water system. 82 Thus, for
example, suppose that the capital costs of water mains are such that it is
inefficient to provide multiple mains in a region. This fact does not justify
creating a monopoly on water distribution, for there are a wide range of
potential strategies to limit the natural monopoly to the specific area where it
exists. Delivery can be unbundled from supply (as was successfully done with
natural gas), 83 or contracting can be used to provide incentives for appropriate
performance by the operator of the natural monopoly aspect of the system.'
Moreover, evidence shows that competition in water supply is more
widespread than many believe because of the potential for groundwater-based
85
systems to compete with surface water-based systems. 1
Second, the concept of a natural monopoly has come under critical
scrutiny in recent years and is no longer as robust as it once was. 8 6 More
recent work has exposed serious conceptual flaws in the definition of natural
monopolies, casting doubt on the extent to which natural monopolies exist in
the real world.' 7 Therefore, the potential existence of a natural monopoly is
insufficient to reject our presumption without specific evidence of actual harm.
C. The Poor
Markets respond to resources, and the poor, by definition, have fewer
resources than the rich. Using markets to distribute water, therefore, appears
on the surface to make the poor worse off than an alternative that does not rely
on individuals' resource endowments to allocate water.'88 Many opponents of
water markets use such arguments.'89 Again, however, we must consider the
nature of the alternative institution to get a true picture of the impact of
markets. If water is not distributed in a market, how will it be distributed?
In the real world, administrative allocation systems have not generally
favored the poor for the simple reason that the poor are rarely politically
powerful enough to secure administrative allocations in their favor. 9 ° There
182. See Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theoryfor Administrativeand Regulatory
Law: A Case Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 135, 138-56 (1998).
183. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., The State of the Transitionto Competitive Markets in NaturalGas and
Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 323-24 (1994).
184. Morriss, supranote 182, at 184-86.
185. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 51.
186. See Thomas Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in UNNATURAL
MONOPOLIES: THE CASE FOR DEREGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES 6-7 (Robert W. Poole Jr. ed., 1985).

187. See id.
188. See, e.g., SEGERFELDT, supranote 4, at 3.
189. See, e.g., id. ("Opponents of [water] privatization look askance at the possibility of making
money from people's need for water and fear that the poor will have this fundamental necessity taken away
from them if they cannot pay for it."); id. at 80 ("The most common point of criticism is that water prices
will rise and the poor will then be unable to afford the water they need.").
190. Id. at 25 ("Politicians are above all anxious to please the constituents and groups on whom they
depend for their reelection. Often these people are not the ones most in need of water, but advantaged
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is a strong that many state subsidized water systems actually operate as a
regressive tax, bestowing benefits on the wealthy while taxing the poor. 9 '
Thus, the appropriate benchmark to evaluate market's performance in this
regard is not a hypothetical "just" distribution under whatever ethical standard
an author might favor, but politically determined, administrative resource
allocations. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the poor lack resources and that
markets distribute more goods to people with more resources. 92 The poor will
is whether
get less than the rich under a market allocation.' 93 The question
94
they will get less than they might under other altematives.'
If we examine the record of markets in providing water, we see that the
poor fare comparatively well under market systems. 95 Real water costs for
poor consumers have often dropped considerably as water systems compete to
extend service to poor areas. 96 Moreover, privatization of water systems
significantly improves water quality by bringing better quality water to poor
neighborhoods. 197 Where there have been problems related to the market
provision of water, the poor are more likely to have been the victim of markets
than the overly aggressive extension of market forces. 198 Nonmarket water
allocation mechanisms, by contrast, have not performed well generally or with
respect to the poor. 99 As Segerfeldt notes, "[t]here are roughly as many
extremely poor people in the world (people living on less than a dollar a day)
as there are people without access to safe water. In fact, these are to a great
extent the same people." 2"
Indeed, it is misleading to discuss "the poor" as a monolithic group with
identical interests. Many poor people in developing countries pay high prices
for water because the only available clean water supply in their neighborhoods
comes from distant wells (where the main cost is the time to fetch the water). 20'
If markets result in neighborhood delivery via water mains, the cost of water
to these poor people-even if higher than the price for piped water in other
neighborhoods-is still likely to be far less than the price they are currently

groups like urban middle classes and well-organized big farmers.").
191. Id. at 53.
192. See id. at 45.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 45-58.
195. See, e.g., id. at 31 (describing success of Chilean privatization).
196. See id. at 51-52.
197. See id. at 61.
198. See id. at 60.
199. See, e.g., id. at 7-8 (noting the extent of the problem and that, in 2003, "probably more people
suffered and died from lack of safe water than as a result of armed conflicts"); see also id. at 27 ("In short,
public water supply in poor countries usually has a low level of coverage, large quantities of spillage,
minimal metering of consumption, and prices that are not proportional to costs. The victims, more often
than not, are the very poorest inhabitants of the poor countries.").
200. Id. at 8-9.
201. Id. at 44,51-56.
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paying. 202 Even if critics' claims that water markets increase the current price
of piped water are true, the poor may still benefit from the extension of water
markets in poor areas. 3 Thus, after describing how water privatization led to
increased service in poor areas in Guinea Segerfeldt notes that "[t]he moral
issue, then, is whether it was worth raising the price for the minority of people
already connected before privatization in order to reach the 70 percent
connected today. Given the dreadful consequences of being without clean,
safe water, this question can only be answered in the affirmative." 20 4
Arguments that the poor will suffer under a market system are thus
underspecified because the impacts of markets are likely to vary among groups
within the larger population of "the poor."2 5 For many of the poor, water
markets are likely to produce a net gain. 2°6 Moreover, to the extent that the
objection is simply an objection to poverty, and assuming that restricting water
markets is a means of income redistribution to the poor, it is a remarkably
inefficient one compared to direct transfers.
D. Alternatives to Markets
As the above brief discussions illustrate, the proper response to the
identification of a problem with markets is to ask "compared to what"? We
cannot judge institutions in isolation, and so one must be prepared to undertake
a comparative institutional analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of
alternative institutions before we draw conclusions about the appropriateness
of any particular institution.
Space constraints prohibit a lengthy analysis of multiple alternative
institutional arrangements. Fortunately, we need not to consider a wide range
of alternatives to understand the institutional strengths of markets because all
the alternatives to markets share one of two common characteristics:
administrative allocation of water rights or the absence of property rights in
water. By examining these two characteristics, we can compare the
institutional strengths and weaknesses of markets and a wide range of
alternatives.
1. Rights-Based Versus Nonrights-BasedAllocations
In nonrights-based allocations, water belongs to the person who takes it.
Without rights to water, it must remain in the commons until captured and
consumed. (Moreover, if capture does not even convey rights, the water must

202.
203.
204.
205.

id. at 51-52.
See id. at 49-50.
Id. at 69.
See id. at 27.

206.

See id. at 49-50.
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be consumed rapidly, or it will be subject to capture by another.) We are
familiar with nonrights-based allocation systems from Garrett Hardin' s classic
article, The Tragedy of the Commons, in which Hardin argued that resources
left in the commons would inevitably and disastrously be over exploited.0 7
The solutions Hardin considered were either privatization (e.g., the creation of
laws or taxing devices" to prevent overexploitation of the
rights) or "coercive
8
commons.

20

Fortunately, subsequent analyses found that the tragic circumstances
postulated by Hardin rarely exist in the world, precisely because the
consequences of nonrights-based regimes are so disastrous. 2°9 Thus, what
appears on first impression to be a commons is often regulated by systems of
customary rights that operate as the functional equivalent to property rights.210
In Hardin's paradigmatic case of the English common field, later research
revealed the existence of customary institutions that limited individuals' ability
to add cattle to the common field and so prevented the tragedy of the
commons. 21' In instances where a rule of capture applies, however, tragedies
of the commons do occur.212 Texas's groundwater regime, for example,
produced results tending toward tragedies of the commons in the 1990s
because it relied on the rule of capture and did not allow rights in groundwater
in place.21 3 Whales, which migrate outside any individual nation's territorial
waters, are another example of a tragedy of the commons which occurred
because of the rule of capture. 214 By awarding property rights only to dead
whales, the nonrights-based system of live-whale ownership threatened a
tragedy of the commons.21 5 Philosopher David Schmidtz has written
eloquently on why property rights create the appropriate incentives for
conservation in such situations,216 and new technology has created the potential
for property rights in live whales that could resolve these tragedies.2 7
While critics of water markets often assert that "community based"
institutions are superior to markets, they are short on explanations of how
these institutions create incentives for appropriate water use and are selective

207.
208.

See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 102 SCl. 1243 (1968).
Id.

209.

See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990).

210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See Barton H. Thompson Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons,
30 ENVTL. L. 241, 266-67 (2000). See generally Zilberman & Upper, supra note 130, at 151 (describing
commons problem in groundwater and rule of capture regimes).
213. See Thompson, supra note 212, at 266-67.
214. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of PropertyRights: Choice Among
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 129 (2001).
215. Id.
216. See David Schmidtz, The Institution ofProperty,in THE COMMON LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(Roger E. Meiners and Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000).
217. See Yandle & Morriss, supra note 214, at 129.
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in their choice of communities." 8 Shiva, for example, is highly critical of
"cowboy economics" and the prior appropriation doctrine in the American
West 9 (and seemingly ignorant of its roots in earlier legal systems), failing
to recognize that the development of prior appropriation -was a community
response to arid conditions in the West. 220 At the same time, she praises
communal water systems in India, which were based on the existence of a
landless caste whose neutrality in allocating water stemmed from their lack of
resources.

22 1

In contrast, with markets there may be distributional issues over who gets
the initial allocation of rights, but once rights are allocated, there is nothing to
stop rights-holders from pooling their water rights into community-based
common pools. Indeed, some communities have managed these
arrangements.22 Given the specificity of the cultural arrangements necessary
to make these systems function, however, such seems little reason to force
everyone to adopt such systems.
The lesson of the tragedy of the commons is that rights-based solutions
have an important advantage over nonrights based institutions in any instance
in which we wish to protect the resource in question from overexploitation.
Because water falls into the category of these resources, a rights-based solution
will be preferable to a nonrights-based solution for water absent extraordinary
circumstances.
2. Administrative Versus Voluntary Allocations
Once we have chosen a rights-based allocation as the basis for our
system, the only questions are how to allocate the initial distribution of rights,
whether to allow reallocations of rights once they are allocated, and if
reallocations are allowed, whether reallocations may take place on a voluntary
basis between individuals or require a centralized decision maker to approve
the reallocation. 223 To some extent, if we allow transfers of allocations, then
218.

See, e.g., SHIVA, supra note 4, at 19 ("[W]ater needs to remain a common good and requires

community management.")
219. Id. at 22-25.
220. See Morriss et al., supra note 4, at 884-88.
221.
SHIVA, supra note 4, at 30. Shiva describes the system as follows:
To ensure neutrality, nirkattis were chosen from the landless caste-the Harijans-who were

granted autonomy from land-owners and caste groups. Only the Harijans held the power to close
and open the tanks or vents. Once the farmers laid down the rules of distribution, no individual
farmer could interfere and those who did could be fined. This protection of the associations from
the economically powerful ensured water democracy.
Id. Shiva does not explain how the existence of a "landless caste" is consistent with democracy nor how
the Harijans would maintain their neutrality if they were allowed to own land. It is difficult to see the moral

merit in a system dependent upon mass disenfranchisement.
222. DVD: 2005 Texas Tech Law Review Water Symposium (on file with author). The conference
discussion of several New Mexico pueblos' water systems was an excellent example of this.
223. DVD: 2005 Texas Tech Law Review Water Symposium (on file with author).
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the initial distribution becomes irrelevant because errors in the initial
distribution can be corrected through transfers.224
Thus, the question becomes whether or not to allow voluntary transfers
of rights or whether to limit voluntary exchanges of rights through some
administrative mechanism.2" When a voluntary transfer occurs, we know that
the parties involved see the transaction as producing a net gain in wealth, for
by definition people do not engage in voluntary transactions that make them
worse off.226 The same cannot be said of involuntary transfers, however,
because our only evidence is that the administrative authority saw the transfers
as desirable.227 As the administrative authority may have less than desirable
motives-a possibility in all systems short of a government of angels 22 -the
public cannot rely on the fact of the transfer to know that the transfer increases
net value.
If we allow voluntary transfers in a rights-based system, we have a
market. If we do not allow voluntary transfers, but permit administrative
reallocations, we do not. There are various intermediate regimes (in which
rights might be taken for public use, for example with compensation paid.)
The comparison of the two extremes illustrates the conceptual distinction.
We would prefer an administrative allocation and reallocation to
voluntary transfers if we thought that the administrators making the allocations
were better equipped to evaluate the transactions in a way that prevented them
from simply communicating their superior knowledge to the rights holders
themselves. For example, if water rights allocations are dependent on detailed
knowledge of the hydrology of a particular water basin, we would want
hydrologists to make the rights allocations and reallocations, rather than the
rights holders only if the hydrologists would be better informed about the

224. Of course, there will be wealth effects of the initial allocations and these may prevent some
reallocations by either voluntary or involuntary means from occurring where the misallocation does not
produce a large enough difference in the total wealth created by the allocations. The larger question of an
appropriate distribution of resources generally is certainly beyond the scope of this paper.
225. One can assume the system will permit some transfers, whether voluntary or involuntary,
because large deadweight losses result from forbidding transfers entirely. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra
note 4, at 60.
226. See supra Part l.A. 1.
227. For example, as Anderson and Snyder note:
Rents can also be obtained... by redistributing the economic pie using the coercive powers of
government. Suppose, for example, that the government is willing to tax a segment of the
population to provide a subsidy for an irrigation project that will allow grape production. If
water is free to the grape farmer but costs taxpayers $60 per acre-foot and produces additional
grapes worth $50, the grape farmer is clearly better off. Those who obtain the subsidized water
from the project capture rents equal to the difference between what they have to pay and what
the water is worth to them. In that process, taxpayers lose part of their income, but grape
growers receiving the subsidized irrigation water enjoy an increase in their wealth.
Id. at48.
228. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 160 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966) ("If men
were angels, no government would be necessary.").
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hydrological consequences of a transfer and nonhydrologists lacked the
capacity to understand the hydrological information. Thus we would vest the
decision-making power in the hydrologists only if the hydrologists could not
reasonably cheaply inform the rights holders of the relevant facts. The transfer
of control of water resources from private hands to federal reclamation
authorities in the American West provides a good example of problems caused
by neglecting to consider whether knowledge could be disseminated rather
than rights seized.229
This is so because even in the case where a deep knowledge of hydrology
is required to evaluate a water rights allocation, the appropriateness of the
allocation will depend on other factors as well. 230 For example, if the issue is
allocating water among agricultural users, knowledge of the appropriateness
of the competing claimants' land for irrigation, including the costs and quality
of the land for use in irrigated agriculture and the users' plans for growing
crops, will be essential. If the question is the more complex one of a trade-off
between urban and agricultural uses, an even wider range of facts is needed to
make the allocation "correct" under whatever standard is used.23' If the
standard is some measurement of the moral worth of the individuals who will
receive the water (with a preference for independent, Jeffersonian farming),
the administrator will need to know whether with that conception of yeoman
farming, desiring to construct a garden to allow themselves to participate in the
preparation of their own food supply, is worthy under the Jeffersonian
standard. The answers to such questions are neither obvious nor cheap to
discover.
The key to this discussion is that administrative allocations require
considerable information.232 Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek set out a
convincing case for the superiority of markets to central planning based on
precisely this point: Markets are efficient processors of decentralized
information, and central planners are not.233 The greater the cost or
incorporating the information we desire from the planner, therefore, the less

229. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supranote 4, at 64 ("Key to the shift of western water development from
private enterprise to governmental control ... was the firm belief by federal reclamation proponents in the
coordination, centralization, and extension of governmental authority in general, coupled with orderly
development of the nation's natural resources through scientific management by disinterested engineers."
(citations omitted)).
230. Morriss et aL, supra note 4, at 338 ("Centralized collection requires experts who may have
general information, but will not have knowledge of the special circumstances of time and place."); Dietz
& Vollebergh, supra note 2, at 342 ("Information on cost curves and technological potentials is not required
if market-based instruments are used," but regulators using command-and-control instruments need this
information).
231. Morriss et al., supra note 4, at 342-43.
232. Id. at 338-39.
233. See Hayek, supra note 46, at 526-27; see also WILLS, supra note 29, at 42-43 (discussing
information demands of even ideal planning).
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likely it is that the planner will in fact incorporate it into the allocation
decisions.
A preference for administrative allocation mechanisms over markets
(other than a preference because an individual fares better personally under the
former) must therefore be based on a claim that the administrative mechanism
is superior to the market in incorporating some information or value into the
decisions2 34 and that this superiority is sufficiently large enough to offset the
market's superiority in considering local knowledge in areas in which the
administrative authority will not have adequate information because of the
transaction costs of amassing and processing information (e.g., the plans of
individuals and local knowledge of specific characteristics of individual plots
of land, etc.) 235 Moreover, the administrative mechanism must be designed in
such a way as to make us believe that it will not incorporate inappropriate
considerations into the decision making (e.g., political factors). 36 Because the
transaction costs of good government are considerable (due process and

234. See generally ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 17-19 (discussing the political economy
of water policy and the possibilities of administration approaches apart from the market ones).
235. The existence of uncertainty in the neoclassical paradigm is often used as a justification for
rejecting markets. As Anderson and Snyder note:
[S]ome economists are skeptical about markets because individuals must act in a world of
uncertainty without perfect information. In the traditional economics paradigm, uncertainty and
information costs imply market failure that warrants government intervention. For example, in
the presence of uncertainty about water availability, many states have drought plans ready to be
implemented by "water experts" in state agencies. Economist Thomas Sowell notes that "the
conduct of social activities depends upon the special knowledge of the few being used to guide
the actions of the many."
Id. (citation omitted). This analysis neglects the important incentive effects of markets and the role of
entrepreneurs. See id. at 24 (noting value of local knowledge based on experience and noting recognition
of concept by conservationist Aldo Leopold); SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 71 ("Centralization is one of
the great problems besetting water supply in poor countries. Local players and representatives are far
removed from power over water."). Some water market critics, such as Shiva, fail to grasp the local nature
of knowledge that markets allow to be considered. Shiva, for example, argues that "cooperative
management systems" are superior to markets because they are free from control by "dominant
bureaucracies." SInVA, supra note 4, at 121-23. Such a claim may have been true historically, and if so,
the cooperative management system is possibly the equal of a local market in its ability to take into account
local information. Multiple examples exist of institutions that manage resources in specific locations
through customary law and other means. See OSTROM, supra note 209, at 58; WHILS, supra note 29, at 99100. Such institutions are not inconsistent with markets, and indeed rely on markets for information about
events outside the local community.
236. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 59-60 ("Perhaps the most obvious example of rent
seeking occurs when allocative decisions are placed in the hands of a state agency or a court. With an
agency or court empowered to allocate or reallocate water, users have an incentive to invest in influencing
the agency's or court's decision.").
Researchers have shown that corruption is common in large public water projects and in the
Third World the interests of water producers are often put before those of the urban poor.
Corruption also occurs on a lesser scale, in the form of employees selling water on the side ....
tampering with users' bills, or allowing people to cut in line for mains water supply.
SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 25. Water market critics seem profoundly naive in this regard. See, e.g.,
StIVA, supra note 4, at xi (contending that markets are "[n]ondemocratic economic systems that centralize
control over decision making and resources").
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separation of powers, for example, are both extremely costly because they
impose considerable transaction costs), 237 and because, as Richard Stroup has
noted, good government itself is a public good and so under-provided, 238 the
gains from incorporating this information must be considerable to make the
use of the administrative alternative a net gain.
E. Foundationsfor Water Markets
Markets generally require secure property rights and the rule of law to
function.239 Water markets are no different. What does it mean to provide
secure property rights to water? Property rights must be "3-D" to support
markets: definable, defensible, and defeasible. 2' For property rights in water
to be definable requires that we be capable of defining the characteristics of
water that make up the bundle of rights in any given case."' Early water rights
definitions in the American West focused on quantity and priority; today, we
also recognize a wide range of quality variables as important. 22 Defensible
property rights are rights recognized by law and capable of being defended in
court against unauthorized interference by others.243 Defeasible property rights
are rights capable of transfer to others.2"
Rights definition for a commodity such as water presents challenges for
the legal system, since the relevant dimensions are likely to change over time
as our knowledge of water and thirst for transactions involving water rights
increase.245 The contours of water rights must, therefore, remain flexible,
allowing courts to expand their boundaries as new knowledge is brought to
bear.2 " A common-law process for water rights definition is likely to be
superior to a statutory definition, for the common law's flexibility will make
the rights more readily expanded to incorporate a new dimension.247 What is
most important is to clearly define water rights.248 "Well-defined water rights

237. WILLS,supra note 29, at 108-09 (describing costs of planning).
238. Stroup, supra note 114, at 485 ("The formation and successful control of a government program
in the public interest, for any reasonable definition of that nebulous term, are themselves public goods.");
see also WILLS, supra note 29, at 106-07 (describing citizens' principal-agent problem with politicians).
239. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 14.
240. See generally, Yandle & Morriss, supra note 214, at 153-58; WLLS, supra note 29, at 23
(describing necessary characteristics of property rights in similar terms).
241. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 214, at 127-29.
242. See id. at 149-50, 158.
243.

ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 167.

244. See id. at 173-75.
245. See id. at 43.
246. Id. at 43-44.
247. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 214, at 165-66.
248. Water markets also require secure property rights more generally. Clear title to land, for
example, is often necessary for individuals to obtain water service. SEGERFELOT, supra note 4, at 2
(discussing problems where there is a lack of title to land in securing water service).
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give individuals a clear idea of what it is they own and hence what actions they
can take regarding the resource."249
Unfortunately, water rights in the United States have often fallen victim
to outdated knowledge through statutory definitions that fail to allow for
expanding definitions of the dimensions of the property right. In-stream uses,
for example, were forbidden by many western prior appropriation states, which
followed a "use-it-or-lose-it" approach and did not recognize preservation of
stream flow as a use.2' Similarly, water rights definitions that tie ownership
of the water rights to ownership of a particular parcel of land obstruct
transactions by increasing the transaction costs of a transfer because the buyer
of the water must also purchase the land associated with the water.
IT. WATER MARKETS AND THE FUTURE

The title of the session is "Precious, Worthless, or Immeasurable:
Perspective on the Valuation of Water." Water can be either precious or
worthless-it depends on the time and place where it sits and flows.25 ' In arid
regions, water tends to have higher values than in more humid areas, where
flooding can give water a negative value in many instances. Water's value is
dependent on a wide range of factors, a range that is difficult for human
institutions to competently value outside the context of real choices by real
people with real resources. 2 Administrative allocations of water all too often
freeze the definition of water, neglecting the fact that our knowledge of
water's value is dynamic. 3 We know more today than we knew fifty or a
hundred years ago about water institutions, about the important attributes of
water, about the possible uses of water, and about potential future use of water.
Yet, we cannot say with any certainty what tomorrow's most valued use for
water will be in any particular location. In 1900, who would have predicted
Phoenix's explosive growth after World War II, the development of shrimp
farming in arid regions in Texas, or the explosive growth of the sport fishing
industry throughout the Rocky Mountain west? Given all that we do not know
and cannot know about the future, there is a high premium exists on the
adaptability of institutions we chose to use for the management of the world's
most precious resources.
Fortunately, the solution to the economic scarcity of water that plagues
more than a billion of our fellow humans is relatively simple and inexpensive:
We must clear away "the current morass of legislative and administrative

249.
250.

ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 23.

251.

ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 23.

252.
253.

See id. at 43-44.
See Morriss etal., supranote 4, at 357-58.

Id. at 80-81.
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rules" that obstruct water markets by preventing markets from developing. 4
Once those markets develop, we will unleash the enormously creative power
of entrepreneurs on the problems of inadequate water, inefficient uses of water,
and poor quality of water.
The threat to this outcome lies in the very value that markets can unlock.
For although the increasing value of water creates incentives to unleash that
value through markets, it also lures special interests that will attempt to
allocate this increasingly valuable resource to themselves through
manipulation of the state5 5 In an earlier history of water law's development,
I noted, "It was not the manipulation of water but the manipulation of
government about water that marked the West., 256 Attempts to rely on
"cultural" explanations for water use neglect the fact that it is not an inherent
characteristic of a culture that determines water use but the incentives created
by that culture's institutions.
What we do not know is that policies matter in human terms. As
Fredrik Segerfeldt noted in his recent book arguing for privatization of water
supply systems, "there is actually an astonishing level of difference between
countries at similar levels of development, suggesting that policies matter a lot
....
,2"8 We have spent decades and billions of dollars on nonmarket attempts
to provide water.5 9 Is it not time to try something else?

254. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 13.
255. Morriss, supra note 4, at 867.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., SWiVA, supra note 4, at 119 ("Cultures that waste water or destroy the fragile web of
the water cycle create scarcity even under conditions of abundance. Those that save every drop can create
abundance out of scarcity.").
258. SEGERFELDT, supra note 4, at 15
259. Id. at 16-17.

